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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 31, 2007, President George W. Bush signed the OPEN Gov-
ernment Act of 2007 into law.' The legislation amends the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act ("FOIA"),2 which has been significantly revised several times
since its enactment in 1966. 3 Congress last amended FOIA in 1996, at which
time lawmakers clarified that government records in all forms-including
computer databases and any other digital or electronic formats-are subject to
the disclosure requirements of FOIA.4
The OPEN Government Act enhances public and press access to govern-
ment-held information in several important procedural ways. Briefly, provi-
sions under the 2007 amendments: (1) strengthen and speed agency compli-
ance with FOIA requests;5 (2) establish tracking numbers for each FOIA re-
quest so that users can follow the progress of their requests online; 6 (3) iden-
tify agencies that reject requests for capricious and arbitrary reasons;7 (4) re-
t Martin E. Halstuk, Ph.D., teaches mass media law at The Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, where he is Associate Professor of Mass Communications, and Senior Fellow at the
Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment. Halstuk is a former courthouse reporter for
the San Francisco Chronicle and a former copy editor at the Los Angeles Times.
Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National (OPEN) Government Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-175 (2007).
2 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
3 See Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966); Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561
(1974); Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976); Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(1986); Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996).
4 110 Stat. at 3049.
5 See OPEN Government Act §§ 4, 6-8.
6 Id. §7.
7 Seeid. §5.
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
quire FOIA compliance of any private-sector companies or other entities with
government contracts;' and (5) award litigation costs to FOIA requesters
whose requests are refused and who subsequently prevail in a lawsuit against
the government to release the records.' These amendments represent signifi-
cant procedural improvements and take an important step toward greater gov-
emment transparency. However, the amendments fail to address systemic ob-
stacles to a transparent government that have developed since the last signifi-
cant overhaul of the statute in 1974.10
The Supreme Court of the United States has granted the Central Intelligence
Agency ("CIA") a near-total exemption to FOIA, giving the CIA sweeping
powers to sidestep strict classification procedures, to withhold unclassified and
declassified information, and to avoid de novo judicial review of CIA deci-
sions to withhold information." As a result, the CIA has broad and unreview-
able discretion to withhold files, records, and documents that the Agency con-
tends may contain sensitive, though unclassified, information. 2
In addition, the Supreme Court has expanded FOIA's privacy exemptions 3
to the extent that government agencies may withhold records simply on the
grounds that a record contains identifying information regarding an individ-
ual. 4 Under this Court-crafted FOIA privacy rationale, an agency can refuse to
release information simply because that disclosure could lead to an unwar-
ranted invasion of privacy of the individual identified in the record-even if
the privacy interest is minimal. In its latest FOIA privacy opinion, the Court
held that when a FOIA requester seeks information for the stated purpose of
investigating government malfeasance-and a federal agency subsequently
raises a privacy exemption to justify nondisclosure of a record-the requester
must provide evidence of wrongdoing in advance to overcome the Court-
crafted privacy protection standard. '"
8 Seeid.§9.
9 Id.§4.
10 See Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974).
11 See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
12 See id. at 182-90 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also Martin E. Halstuk & Eric B.
Easton, Of Secrets and Spies, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 353, 355-56 (2006) (detailing the
effects of the Sins holding on CIA secrecy).
'3 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000) (safeguarding personal information contained in
personnel, medical, and similar files); id. § 552(b)(7)(C) (protecting private information
contained in law enforcement records).
14 See Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 600-01 (1982) (holding
unanimously that even a minimal individual privacy interest is sufficient to trigger personal
privacy Exemption 6 (Personal Privacy), and a file need not contain highly intimate per-
sonal information to be withheld).
15 See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004) ("Where
there is a privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) [Law Enforcement] and the public
interest being asserted is to show that responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise
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By granting the CIA a near-total exemption from FOIA and by expanding
FOIA's privacy exemptions, the Supreme Court has gradually but severely
narrowed the scope of government agency accountability by reducing FOIA's
public interest standard in disclosure while expanding government interests in
secrecy. 16
This article demonstrates the vital need for Congress to reevaluate FOIA's
core premises, and to provide legislative remedies needed to correct FOIA's
current shortcomings. Part II examines the historical events and legislative
history leading to the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act of 1966.
Part III discusses the FOIA ratification fight that led to the crafting of the Act's
exemptions. Part IV analyzes the amendments to FOIA, culminating with the
OPEN Government Act of 2007. Finally, Part V identifies how the Supreme
Court's current interpretation of the national security and personal privacy ex-
emptions obstructs the American public's right to know "what their govern-
ment is up to."' 7
II. THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
A. Fostering and Preserving Democracy
Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 to make public
the activities and processes of the federal government's approximately one
hundred federal agencies and departments. 8 The scope of information that the
agencies collect is wide and diverse. Such information ranges from Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") compilations of criminal activities by organ-
ized-crime figures with ties to government contractors, 9 to United States Cen-
sus Bureau statistics revealing zip codes with the highest and lowest per capita
household incomes in the nation.20 FOIA requesters are equally varied and
include journalists, attorneys, private individuals, private detectives, public
interest groups, prison inmates, small businesses, large corporations, and ad-
improperly in the performance of their duties, the requester must establish more than a bare
suspicion in order to obtain disclosure.").
16 See, e.g., id. (limiting access to police records where privacy exemption standards are
satisfied); Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749
(1989) (denying third-party access to an Federal Bureau of Investigation rap sheet under the
privacy exemption); Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (allowing the CIA to refrain from disclosing the
identity of individuals and institutions conducting research for the CIA).
17 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773.
18 Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250.
19 See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 757.
20 See Assembly of the State of Calif. v. Dep't of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916 (9th Cir.
1992) (allowing the State Assembly to access computer tapes containing census statistics).
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vocacy organizations as ideologically disparate as the environmental organiza-
tion Greenpeace 2" and the conservative watchdog group Judicial Watch.22 As it
has often been said, FOIA is available to "scholars" and "scoundrels" alike.23
FOIA creates a judicially enforceable public right of access to the vast
storehouses of information gathered by the federal government in all forms and
formats.24 It reflects a "general philosophy of full agency disclosure," limiting
agency discretion over whether information may be released to the public.25
FOIA grants the public a right to examine the records held by the roughly
eighty federal administrative and regulatory agencies such as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, as well as the fifteen executive branch departments, including the Presi-
dent's cabinet offices.26 FOIA also applies to cabinet subdepartments, such as
the Census Bureau in the Department of Commerce, and all federal govern-
ment controlled corporations, such as mortgage insurers Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, which are overseen by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. 7 FOIA does not, however, apply to records held by Congress,
state or local governments, the courts, or private individuals. 8 Nor does it ap-
ply to the President, the personal staff of the President, nor those whose sole
function is to advise and assist the President, such as the Council of Economic
Advisors.29 Additionally, it further requires that the government make public
certain information without a request. For example, agencies must publish in
the Federal Register any organizational descriptions or procedural rules.3 °
Other records, such as final agency opinions, must be made available in public
reading rooms."
Under FOIA, "any person" can request a record, and a requester is not re-
quired to provide a purpose for which the record is being requested. 2 The term
"record" has been defined broadly to include reports, e-mails, letters, manuals,
photos, films, and sound recordings.33 These materials can be in any form or
21 See Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining that Knight brought this
case in order to obtain information from the CIA regarding the sinking of a Greenpeace
vessel).
22 See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep't of Energy, 412 F.3d 125 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
23 Dums v. Bureau of Prisons, 804 F.2d 701, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
24 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
25 S. REP. No. 89-813, at 38 (1965).
26 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & PRIVACY ACT OVER-
VIEW 32-36 (2004) [hereinafter FOIA GUIDE].
27 Id. at 32 n.5.
28 Id. at 32-35.
29 Id. at 35 & n.12.
30 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).
31 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2).
32 FOIA GUIDE, supra note 26, at 44, 46.
33 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (2000).
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format, including digital and computerized files.34 Furthermore, FOIA places
the burden on the government to explain its decisions refusing disclosure. 5
The chief rationale behind FOIA is that without public access to govern-
ment-held information, the nation and the body politic would be deprived of
information that is vitally important to evaluate the performance of govern-
ment agencies.36 FOIA also holds accountable the officials and bureaucrats
who conduct the nation's business.37 For example, government information
can reveal government plans (or a lack of plans) in the event of widespread
natural disasters; reports that disclose how the government intends to ensure
energy sources for future generations; and updates on the government's pro-
gress in keeping American cities safe from terrorist attacks. In the decades
since its enactment, FOIA has been used, among other things, to disclose cor-
ruption, waste, and fraud in the federal government, and to identify serious
health hazards, unsafe drugs, and dangerous consumer products.3"
The exhaustive legislative history of FOIA39 makes clear that preserving and
fostering democratic principles lays at the heart of the statute. The general
public must have a judicially enforceable right of access to government-held
information so that they may hold accountable those who govern them, from
high ranking officials to lower level bureaucrats. As one of FOIA's principal
drafters declared, "[p]ublic business is the public's business."40
It is also clear, however, that tensions may arise when the public's right to
obtain government-held information conflicts with other societal concerns,
such as the government's needs to protect national security, law enforcement
investigations, and trade secrets. In such instances, there may be a legitimate
reason to keep information on government activities confidential, at least for a
time. For example, disclosure of imminent battle plans may endanger the lives
34 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2).
35 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
36 See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 6-7 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448,
3449-50.
37 Id.
38 Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 2(a)(3), (4),
110 Stat. 3048, 3048.
39 See H. REP. No. 89-1497 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418; S. REP.
No. 89-813 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 93-1380 (1974) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. No. 94-880
(1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183; H.R. REP. No. 104-795, as reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448.
40 HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RE-
CORDS AND PROCEEDINGS, xiii (1953). Harold L. Cross was counsel to the American Society
of Newspaper Editors and a legal adviser to the subcommittees for the Government Opera-
tions Committee, which was responsible for drafting the FOIA bill. First Amendment Cen-
ter, Harold L. Cross Biography,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org//biography.aspx?name=cross&SearchString=' Harold
L. Cross' (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
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of military personnel and undermine a war effort. Government records that
enhance the accountability of law enforcement agencies can also, if disclosed,
endanger the safety and lives of law enforcement personnel and their families,
undercover informants, and witnesses. The safety and lives of covert intelli-
gence agents and their sources may also be jeopardized by disclosures of cer-
tain information. Resolving the challenges posed by such tension lies in strik-
ing a workable balance that protects legitimate confidentiality interests, yet
also places emphasis on full disclosure."
B. A General Philosophy of Full Disclosure
FOIA's legislative history repeatedly emphasizes that the law was intended
to provide the fullest disclosure possible. 2 FOIA lawmakers observed that
tensions among competing values are characteristic of a democratic society
and must be resolved by a balancing of interests: "[a]t the same time that a
broad philosophy of 'freedom of information' is enacted into law, it is neces-
sary to protect certain equally important rights of privacy with respect to cer-
tain information in Government files."43 Hence, Congress created nine FOIA
exemptions to establish certain categories of information that agencies may
withhold from the public.' These enumerated exemptions provide the only
bases for nondisclosure under the statute. They are discretionary and they are
to be narrowly interpreted by agencies and the courts.45
Prior to FOIA's enactment, the public had no recourse when the government
denied access to public records.46 The first recorded condemnations of federal
agency secrecy and demands for reform came from the American legal estab-
lishment more than thirty years before Congress enacted FOIA.47 The Ameri-
can Bar Association ("ABA") complained that there were no requirements,
statutory or otherwise, for providing and enforcing public disclosure of agency
rules, agency operations, and decision making procedures. According to its
1934 report on administrative law, federal agencies promulgated thousands of
complex rules and regulations, often complicated by supplements and frequent
amendments.4" Some administrative orders were made known weeks or months
41 S. REP. No. 89-813, at 38.
42 See supra note 39.
43 S. REP. No. 89-813, at 38.
44 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (2000); see also infra tbl. 1.
45 H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 228-29 (1974) (Conf. Rep.); see also Chrysler v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979).
46 See CROSS, supra note 40, at 197.
47 See Erwin Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law: A Plea for Better Publi-
cation of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198, 198-200 (1934).
41 Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, in 59 REPS. OF AM. B. ASS'N
539, 553-54 (1934).
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after being implemented and were poorly organized, making public examina-
tion difficult.49 President Franklin D. Roosevelt responded to the ABA's criti-
cism by forming a committee headed by the United States Attorney General's
Office to examine administrative agency procedures and recommend re-
forms.5" However, its work was suddenly interrupted when the United States
entered World War II.
After the end of World War II, the public was hungry for information about
world events that were both astonishing and alarming. The threat of nuclear
war became a feared reality. Communism swept far beyond the Soviet Union's
borders and sped its ascendancy into China. The Cold War chilled interna-
tional relations, and a new conflict loomed in Korea. In response to these
events, the United States government increasingly shrouded its agency proc-
esses from public inspection. In 1947, famed constitutional scholar and civil
libertarian Zechariah Chafee, Jr., observed that while "state secrets are nothing
new," government secrecy continued to grow and was becoming "a more and
more serious danger."'"
Angry over growing government secrecy, news producers launched a cam-
paign for the public's "right to know."52 At the head of the media's right to
know phalanx were the Associated Press Managing Editors Association, the
Radio-Television News Directors Association, and the Society of Professional
Journalists (then known as Sigma Delta Chi)." Knight Newspapers Executive
Editor Basil L. Walters declared in 1950 that "all public records belong to the
people; that officials are merely the servants of the people; that newspapers are
the eyes of the people, keeping the eternal spotlight on officials and on public
records."54 The news media gained the support of reform-minded members of
Congress along with a broad public coalition that included the nation's legal
establishment, and a host of public interest and consumer groups.55
49 See id. at 554.
50 McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON
&ORG. 180, 197 (1999).
51 1 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS: A REPORT
FROM THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 13 (1947).
52 The phrase "right to know," was coined by Associated Press Executive Director Kent
Cooper in 1945 when he stated that "[t]here cannot be political freedom in one country, or
in the world, without respect for 'the right to know."' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1945, at 18.
53 See generally CROSS, supra note 40.
54 American Society of Newspaper Editors, Newspapers Awake to Constant Threat to
Press Freedom, THE BULL., Feb. 1, 1950, at 2.
55 See Welford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 768, 769-70 (D.D.C. 1970) (noting that con-
sumer groups, which were among FOIA's early users, strongly supported FOIA because it
allowed access to research findings given to agencies by govemment-regulated businesses
and industries, such as data regarding the use of pesticides, which was first made public
after researchers sued the government to obtain the information); see also Consumers Union
of U.S. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796, 798, 808-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (describing
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In an effort to appease the media and the longtime grievances of the ABA, 6
Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") in 1946." 7 How-
ever, this legislation quickly proved to be an inadequate tool to foster transpar-
ency. The stated purpose of the APA was to establish procedures among the
myriad federal agencies, which prior to the act made their own rules and regu-
lations for releasing information to the public. 8 In particular, the APA in-
cluded a public information provision specifically intended to provide access
to "matters of official record" held by government agencies. 9 As Senate Re-
port 752 noted, "[a]dministrative operations and procedures are public prop-
erty [that] the general public, rather than a few specialists or lobbyists, is enti-
tled to know or to have the ready means of knowing with definiteness and as-
surance."60
In practice, however, the APA contained numerous caveats and loopholes
that federal agencies routinely exploited to block public access to their records.
For example, the APA gave agencies the discretion to withhold documents as
"confidential for good cause found," but the law provided no definition for this
vague phrase. 61 Section 3 also allowed the government to withhold any infor-
mation "requiring secrecy in the public interest," but there were no guidelines
as to what would qualify as a public interest standard.62 Perhaps the greatest
obstacle to disclosure was the section 3 rule that requesters of information
were required to be "properly and directly concerned" with the information
sought.63 This phrase permitted agencies to deny access to persons requesting
information if the information did not pertain specifically to the requesters
themselves. 6 This restriction thus blocked third parties, such as journalists,
attorneys, public interest groups, scientists, and historians, from obtaining gov-
ernment records. The Department of Justice, which was charged by Congress
with enforcing APA compliance, not only failed to exercise oversight but also
engaged in "gross, clear, flagrant and continued violations" of section 3.65
how the Consumers Union used FOIA to obtain hearing aid testing results from the Veter-
ans Administration).
56 See Robert 0. Blanchard, The Freedom of Information Act-disappointment and
hope, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Fall 1967, at 17.
57 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
58 S. REP. No. 79-752, at 7 (1945).
59 Id. at 13.
60 Id. at 12.
61 Administrative Procedure Act § 3.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 H. REP. No. 89-1497, at 27 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2423.
For example, the Postmaster General declared in 1959 that "the public was not 'properly
and directly concerned' in knowing the names and salaries of postal employees." Id.
65 S. 1160, S. 1336, S. 1798, and S. 1879; Bills to Amend the Administrative Procedure
Act and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Proce-
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Against the backdrop of this flawed public access statute and mounting
global unease, government secrecy expanded further. In 1951, President Harry
S. Truman issued Executive Order 10,290, which for the first time allowed
nonmilitary civilian agencies to classify information.66 According to Truman,
the press had disclosed ninety-five percent of the nation's secret information
and therefore, this order was necessary to protect American interests abroad.67
The Truman order prescribed "regulations establishing minimum standards for
the classification, transmission, and handling, by departments and agencies of
the Executive Branch, of official information which requires safeguarding in
the interest of the security of the United States. 68 It was a sweeping decree,
applying to all federal agencies and departments and granting bureaucrats un-
reviewable authority to withhold government information. 69 The order author-
ized nonmilitary agency bureaucrats to stamp materials "Top Secret," "Secret,"
"Confidential," and "Restricted" without defining these categories." More-
over, there was no system to review or appeal the classifying decisions.
C. An Angry Press Responds
The media's response was swift, led by the most celebrated broadcast jour-
nalist of that era, Edward R. Murrow. Murrow told his broadcast audience that
Truman's order extended secrecy "into vast areas where, by no stretch of the
imagination would legitimate security interests be involved."7 A Wall Street
Journal editorial declared that a "free government lives on the freedom of the
people to know what their government is doing. There are risks in this, of
course, but they are not near so great as the risks we run if government...
deprive[s] the people of the freedom to know [what] they are doing."72
dure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 144 (1965) (statement of Kenneth Culp
Davis, University of Chicago law professor and consultant to the Moss subcommittee).
Congress eventually acknowledged that the statute was "full of loopholes which allow[ed]
agencies to deny legitimate information to the public." S. REP. No. 89-813, at 38 (1965).
The United States Supreme Court criticized the APA for being "plagued with vague
phrases," and providing "no remedy for wrongful withholding of information." EPA v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
66 Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. 471, 472 (1952). Previously, Roosevelt issued an
order establishing classification rules for the military only. See Exec. Order No. 8,381, 3
C.F.R. 117, 117-18 (1940).
67 See When Mr. Truman Sounded off on Responsibilities of the Press, EDITOR & PUB-
LISHER, Oct. 13, 1951, at 7, 62. For example, Truman cited a map published in Fortune
magazine that depicted the locations of nuclear research plants, even though the Department
of Defense had not approved its publication. Id.
68 Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. at 471-72.
69 See CROSS, supra note 40, at 206.
70 Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. at 474-75.
71 A.M. SPERBER, MuRRow: His LIFE AND TIMES 360 (1986).
72 The Freedom ofIgnorance, Editorial, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1951, at A6.
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James S. Pope, chairman of the American Society of Newspaper Editors
Freedom of Information Committee, commissioned a study on secrecy within
the federal and state governments. 7 Pope asked one of the nation's top news-
paper lawyers, Harold L. Cross, to conduct the report.74 In his resultant report,
Cross detailed the extent to which the federal and state governments routinely
denied public requests for access to information.75 He characterized federal
agencies as an "official cult of secrecy" that used "tortured interpretation[ s] of
acts of Congress" to justify withholding public records." Cross attributed the
"heavy increase of secrecy"77 to an attitude among federal bureaucrats that
records were "quasi-confidential, privileged communications.""
The Cross study identified two major legal hurdles that obstructed public
access to federal agency records. The first was the loophole-riddled section 3
of the APA.79 The second was an arcane 1789 law known as the Housekeeping
Statute, which granted agencies the authority to store and use records.8" Agen-
cies contended that this obscure law also granted bureaucrats the power to es-
tablish their own rules for disclosure. 8' Agencies successfully cited the phrase
"custody, use and preservation" of records as their authority to justify with-
holding government information.82 Pope called the Housekeeping Statute the
"fountainhead of secrecy" in administrative agencies.8 The study provided the
government reform movement with a specific goal-amending the APA and
the Housekeeping Statute."
73 See CROSS, supra note 40, at viii-ix.
74 See id. at viii.
75 See id. at viii-ix.
76 Id. at 246.
77 Id. at 9.
78 Id. at 198 (conceding that executive records are "quasi-confidential," but arguing that
selection of information that the public has some right to know has become an "official
right").
79 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
80 The Housekeeping Statute provides that:
The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent
with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers and clerks,
the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use and preservation
of the records, papers and property appertaining to it.
5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules
with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 486 n.81 (2002)
("The Housekeeping Act consolidated into one place various housekeeping powers that had
been conferred on department heads in prior acts.").
81 See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 23-24 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2418, 2419-20.
82 See CROSS, supra note 40, at 216.
83 James S. Pope, The Cult of Secrecy, NIEMAN REPORTS, Oct. 1951, at 9.
84 H. REP. No. 89-1497, at 23, as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2419 (noting that
Cross also identified the "executive privilege concept" as in need of reform).
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The congressional campaign for agency transparency was led by Represen-
tative John E. Moss (D-CA). In 1955, Moss launched a formal House investi-
gation into agency secrecy. 85 He capitalized on the momentum created that
year when the Hoover Commission86 released a blistering condemnation of
government secrecy and called for reform of the APA. 7 The House then
formed the Special Government Information Subcommittee in 1955, and Moss,
who by then had emerged as one of the leading congressional critics of agency
secrecy, was appointed its chairman.88 From November 1955 through April
1959, the subcommittee "held 173 public hearings and investigations and is-
sued seventeen volumes of hearings transcripts and fourteen volumes of re-
ports."89 The first action taken by the subcommittee was to remove the vaguely
worded provisions in section 3 of the APA, which permitted agencies to deny
records if requested materials were "confidential for good cause found," re-
quired "secrecy in the public interest," or were not "properly and directly"
concerning the requestor.9 ° Meanwhile, a Senate bill to amend the APA was
introduced by Senator Thomas Hennings (D-MO), an early supporter of infor-
mation policy reform and Moss's counterpart in the Senate.9
Routinely, advocates for reform faced resistance from both federal agencies
and witnesses who testified at hearings and were hostile to the idea of amend-
ing the Housekeeping Statute and the APA. None of the agencies supported
reform, arguing that the cost of implementing the legislation and bureaucratic
requirements were disproportionate to the public benefit that the reform would
provide.92 Agency opposition was led principally by Representative Clare
85 See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 172 (1998).
86 The First Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government
was established in 1947 and chaired by former President Herbert C. Hoover. This Commis-
sion, commonly referred to as the Hoover Commission, "[s]tudied and investigated organi-
zation and methods of operation of the Executive branch of the Federal Government, and
recommended organization changes to promote economy, efficiency, and improved ser-
vice." The Nat'l Archives, Records of the Commissions on Organization of the Executive,
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/264.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2008).
87 See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 23-24 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2418, 2419-20.
88 See MOYNIHAN, supra note 85, at 172 (explaining that Moss urged the creation of the
subcommittee).
89 HELEN N. KRUGER, THE ACCESS TO FEDERAL RECORDS LAW 1 (1967).
90 Id. at 1-2.
91 103 CONG. REC. 7490(1957).
92 See JAMES T. O'REILLY, 1 FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 12 (3d. ed. 2000). The
State Department protested that fulfilling record requests would "impose a crushing burden
upon the Department's personnel ...." STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG.,
A BILL TO AMEND THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT 46 (Comm. Print 1959). The Department of Agriculture objected that it would be "un-
reasonable, extremely burdensome, and costly" to require agencies to publish their rules and
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Hoffman (R-MI), who denied that agencies refused to disclose their activities
to the public. Hoffman accused the Moss Committee of being the pawn of a
power hungry and greedy newspaper industry and journalists who sought ac-
cess to information for political purposes.93 Hoffman argued that a federal
open records law would allow journalists to obtain government information
that they could use out of context and exploit in order to advance the political
agendas of the media and journalists themselves.94
In 1958, Congress ended agency abuses of the 180 year-old Housekeeping
Statute with a bill that made clear that the Housekeeping Statute did not grant
agencies the power to withhold records from the public.95 Still, government
agencies stubbornly shrouded their activities from public view. For example,
in 1962, the National Science Foundation ruled that it was not "in the public
interest" to disclose cost estimates submitted by unsuccessful contractors in
connection with a multi-million dollar deep sea study.9 6 From 1962 to 1964,
there were six failures by NASA to launch a moon probe spacecraft designed
by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory-at a cost of $18 million each at the time-
but investigative reports on what went wrong were kept secret.97 And, during
the height of the Cold War, the United States Navy refused to disclose why the
U.S.S. Kitty Hawk was completed nearly two years behind schedule and forty-
eight percent over the $120 million bid by the contractor.9"
By 1963, prompted by frustration over agency and administration stonewall-
ing, Congress decided to craft an entirely new federal open records law, rather
than revise the loophole-riddled APA. Moss was appointed head of the new
Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee, which,
among other objectives, was to complete the reform of the federal information
orders in the Federal Register. Id. at 5. The Civil Service Commission complained that the
law would "lead to endless controversy over our authority to withhold such records from
public inspection and would create an intolerable situation .... " Id. at 10. The United
States Postal Service contended that the statute would compel the Office to "open its files of
pornographic material to all members of the public, including minors .... Id. at 36.
93 H.R. REP. No. 85-1461, at 25-28 (1958).
94 Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies: Hearings Be-
fore the H. Comm. on Government Operations, 84th Cong. 8 (1956) (statement of Clare
Hoffman, Member, House Comm. on Gov't Operations).
95 See Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547 (1958); see also H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 23-
24 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2419-20.
96 H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 26, as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2422. It was later
discovered that the firm that won the lucrative contract was not the lowest bidder.
97 Associated Press, Moss Battles 'Secrecy Curtain,' CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
May 11, 1964, at 3.
98 Id.
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dissemination and access policy.99 That year the precursor bill to FOIA, Senate
Bill 1666, was introduced.'00
III. ROUGH ROAD TO RATIFICATION
Predictably, Senate Bill 1666 was met with strong opposition from the fed-
eral agencies, led by the Department of Justice, which wanted the law revised
to exempt several categories of information from disclosure. 0' The original
version drafted by the Moss Committee contained only three exemptions: (1)
information exempt by executive order for reasons of national defense; (2)
information exempt by existing congressional statutes; and (3) information
exempt by reason that, if disclosed, would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy."' 2 By the time the final bill moved through Congress, six
additional exemptions were added as a result of often contentious negotiations
between Congress and the Department of Justice.
The final version of FOIA, enacted in 1966, contained nine exemptions that
shield from disclosure matters that are: (1) classified as national security in-
formation; (2) related to internal agency personnel information; (3) specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute; (4) trade secrets and other confidential
business and financial information; (5) inter- and intra-agency memoranda; (6)
files involving personal privacy; (7) law enforcement investigation records; (8)
reports from regulated financial institutions; and (9) geological data for oil and
gas drilling."'3
Table 1 - FOIA Exemptions
Exemption Number Exemption Subject Matter
1 National Security
2 Agency Personnel
3 Existing Exemptions
4 Trade Secrets
5 Agency Memoranda
6 Personal Privacy
7 Law Enforcement
8 Financial Institutions
9 Geological Data
99 MOYNIHAN, supra note 85, at 172.
100 S. REP.NO. 88-1219(1964).
1o' See id. at 11.
102 110 CONG. REC. 17,668 (1964).
103 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (2000).
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From the outset, the Moss committee recognized the need to protect defense
information properly classified by Presidential Executive Order. This was
evinced by the inclusion of an exemption to protect national security informa-
tion in the original FOIA draft." This protection was ultimately embodied in
Exemption I (National Security).' 5
Executive branch concerns led to a number of demands for additional non-
disclosure protections. For example, agencies pushed for Exemption 2
(Agency Personnel) to protect agencies from harassment regarding trivial in-
ternal matters of little public interest, such as employee work schedules and
parking permits. These materials have been described more extensively in the
legislative history to include procedural manuals for employees, operating
rules, records used for internal housekeeping, and information pertaining to
litigation in which the agency is a party. °6 The Supreme Court subsequently
held that Exemption 2's general purpose is to "relieve agencies of the burden
of assembling and maintaining for public inspection matter in which the public
could not reasonably be expected to have an interest." '' 17
The exemption stating that FOIA would not nullify any existing statutes was
included in the first draft of the legislation to mollify agencies that opposed
FOIA. Agencies feared that FOIA would override agency authority to with-
hold confidential information protected under already existing laws. '08 This
protection became Exemption 3 (Existing Exemptions).
Exemption 4 (Trade Secrets) was included to protect the proprietary infor-
mation of businesses and corporations by safeguarding matters pertaining to
"trade secrets and commercial or financial information."'0 9 Federal agencies
persuaded Congress that government-regulated businesses-such as drug
manufacturers, food producers, and telecommunications firms-needed assur-
ances that the proprietary and confidential business information they were re-
quired to submit to federal agencies would be protected."' Under Exemption
104 110 CONG. REC. 17,666 (1964); see also Open Letter from Thomas C. Hennings, Jr.,
U.S. Senate, to the national press (Oct. 27, 1958) (on file with author) ("With another ses-
sion of Congress just a few months away, it is time now to step up action against another
improper secrecy practice .... the widespread misuse of the public information section of
the Administrative Procedure Act as authority for keeping secret information about gov-
ernment operations which [do] not have the slightest connection with the requirements of
national security, military operations, or justified personal privacy.").
105 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
106 H.R. REP. 89-1497, at 31 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2427.
107 Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 369-70 (1976).
108 See Robert 0. Blanchard, A History of the Federal Records Law, UNIV. MO. COLUM.
SCH. JOURNALISM, Nov. 1967, at 7.
109 Freedom on Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 251 (1966).
11O S. REP. No. 88-1219, at 6 (1964).
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4, FOIA would not apply to business information that would "customarily not
be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.""'
Agency decision making procedures themselves are shielded under Exemp-
tion 5 (Agency Memoranda). The legislative intent behind Exemption 5 was to
protect the government by preventing litigants from using FOIA for discovery
purposes." 2 This exemption protects "inter-agency or intra-agency memoran-
dums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency.""' 3 Hence, the exemption recognizes, and
excludes from discovery, the three major common law privileges: (1) the at-
torney work-product privilege; (2) the attorney-client privilege; and (3) the
deliberative-process privilege. The documents ordinarily covered by the delib-
erative-process privilege include pre-decisional advisory opinions, pre-
decisional recommendations, and deliberations reflecting the decision making
process. "' Also protected are early drafts of final reports" 5 and e-mails that are
part of the agency deliberative process." 6 The exemption does not protect
post-decisional reports and documents.
FOIA drafters themselves advocated for protection of personal privacy. As
early as 1960, the committee agreed that an exemption protecting unwarranted
invasions of privacy was necessary to avert potential abuses of the statute for
political or personal reasons." 7 This exemption drew on the national experi-
ence of the Senator Joseph McCarthy hearings, which were still painfully fresh
in the public mind."8 During that tumultuous period, journalists justifiably
feared they could lose their jobs if branded a Communist, regardless of
whether the charge was true." 9 These concerns were ultimately embodied in
Exemption 6 (Personal Privacy).
Initially, FOIA lawmakers did not see a need for Exemption 7 (Law En-
forcement). 2 ° Instead, they asserted that adequate protections shielding sensi-
I ld. (including examples such as manufacturing processes, business sales information
and data, workforce information, stock inventories, and customer lists).
112 H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 31, as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2427.
"3 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2000).
114 See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 26, at 391.
115 See id. at 392.
116 Grand Central Partnership, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 482-83 (2d Cir. 1999).
"7 See 5 U.S.C. 1002 Discussed, UNIV. MO. COLUM. SCH. JOURNALISM, Dec. 1960, at 3.
118 See id.
119 See MARGARET A. BLANCHARD, EXPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE PRESS-
GOVERNMENT CRUSADE OF 1945-1952, at 380-83 (1986).
120 Exemption 7 is the most detailed of the statutory exemptions. It contains six specific
harms that could reasonably be expected to result from disclosure of a law enforcement
record or document. The exemption shields from disclosure matters that are:
[R]ecords or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the ex-
tent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could rea-
sonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a
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tive law enforcement files already existed under other federal and state stat-
utes.'2 The Department of Justice successfully argued that unrestricted public
access to law enforcement records, particularly pending investigations, could
pose a threat to the safety and lives of witnesses and undercover informants. '22
Exemption 7 reflects Congress's efforts to balance the need for transparency of
law enforcement operations to ensure accountability against the government's
need to keep information confidential to safeguard effective investigations and
prosecutions. In some instances, even closed case files can leave clues for
criminals or their representatives, pointing to the identities of informants. As
originally enacted in 1966, the exemption provided only that agencies were
allowed to withhold "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses except to the extent available by law to a private party."'23 After its en-
actment, courts broadly construed Exemption 7 as creating a virtual "blanket"
exemption for all investigatory files, regardless of whether they concerned
civil or criminal information, whether the requested law enforcement investi-
gations were pending or closed, and whether disclosure could or would cause
any harm. 124
Exemption 8 (Financial Institutions) was designed to protect the interests of
businesses regulated by federal agencies. It shields information "contained in
or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on be-
half of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervi-
sion of financial institutions."'25 Congress included this exemption at the insis-
tence of the federal banking regulatory agencies, which argued that protections
for financial institutions are necessary to safeguard the security of the banking
industry. '26 Exemption 8 covers federal records containing information regard-
person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be ex-
pected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably
be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or
foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a
confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law
enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency con-
ducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a
confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement
investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement inves-
tigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk cir-
cumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or
physical safety of any individual.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2000).
121 S. REP. No. 88-1219, at 7 (1964). For example, the Jenks Act controls the timing of
the release of discovery materials to the defense. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000).
122 See Malizav v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 519 F. Supp. 338, 349-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
123 Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 251 (1966).
124 FOIA GUIDE, supra note 26, at 499.
125 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8).
126 O'REILLY, supra note 92, at 253-54.
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ing the operations of the nation's financial systems and their regulatory agen-
cies, mainly the Federal Reserve System, the office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.'27 Courts have interpreted
Exemption 8 interests to also extend to nondepository institutions and to fi-
nancial institution records held by an agency that does not regulate the institu-
tion. "'28 Courts have upheld this exemption's broad application, reasoning that
disclosure of bank examination reports "of any type" could erode public confi-
dence in a financial institution. 2 9
Finally, Exemption 9 (Geological Data) covers "geological and geophysical
information and data, including maps, concerning wells."'3 ° This is the least
often invoked exemption, which, according to its legislative history, was in-
tended to protect independent prospectors as well as the established gas and oil
industries against speculators. 1"' Federal agencies contended that this protec-
tion was needed because seismic and geological exploration data, and scien-
tific and technical information were not covered by Exemption 4's (Trade Se-
crets) "trade secret" and "confidential commercial information" categories.'32
According to leading FOIA authority James T. O'Reilly, Exemption 9 is the
"most suspect" of FOIA's exemptions because its protection is already embod-
ied in Exemption 4 (Trade Secrets). "' Nonetheless, courts have interpreted
Exemption 9 to extend a special category of confidentiality protection to such
agencies as the Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management, the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Power Commission. 13 4
FOIA's legislative history makes clear that its exemptions are to be nar-
rowly construed, and, outside of these limited categories, "all citizens have a
right to know."'35 Justice William Brennan, writing for the Supreme Court ma-
jority in one of the earliest FOIA opinions, observed that Congress enacted
FOIA to "pierce the veil" of government secrecy so that the public can evalu-
ate the government's performance and promote governmental accountabil-
ity.'36 He also wrote that the statute's "basic purpose reflected 'a general phi-
losophy of full agency disclosure' unless information falls under one of the
127 Id. at 253.
128 Pub. Citizen v. Farm Credit Admin., 938 F.2d 290, 293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
129 Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
130 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(9).
'3' H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 11 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2428-
29.
132 Id.
133 O'REILLY, supra note 92, at 256.
134 Id. at 257.
135 S. REP. No. 89-813, at 41 (1965); see also Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293
(1979) ("Congress did not design the FOIA exceptions to be mandatory bars to disclo-
sure.").
136 Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
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nine exemptions. ' Further, the Court held that the statutory exemptions are
strictly limited and "do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not se-
crecy, is the dominant objective of the Act."''
The FOIA bill was approved by the Senate on October 13, 1965,' and
passed by the House on June 20, 1966.4' President Lyndon B. Johnson signed
FOIA into law on July 4, 1966, despite overwhelming agency objections and
his own misgivings. 1' When Johnson signed FOIA into law, he was enthusias-
tic, stating:
This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: A democracy works
best when the people have all the information that the security of the Nation permits.
No one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be re-
vealed without injury to the public interest. 42
His reservations remained evident, however, in a strongly worded caveat he
added to his signing statement regarding the prerogatives of executive privi-
lege: "[T]his bill in no way impairs the President's powers under our Constitu-
tion to provide for confidentiality when the national interest so requires.' 43
Despite overwhelming congressional support and a unanimous vote by the
House, FOIA's first few years were disappointing to the law's advocates. This
was mainly due to the fact that many agencies failed to comply with the law
because of deliberate evasion, ignorance of their responsibilities, or pressure
from superiors.'" Agencies used various ploys to discourage FOIA use: bu-
reaucrats claimed they could not find documents; 45 long delays in responding
to FOIA requests were commonplace;'46 agencies broadly interpreted the ex-
emptions to justify withholding and denied requests on technicalities; and
clerical research charges were often exorbitant, ranging from $3.00 to $7.00
per hour, making specialized access requests well beyond the reach of most
individuals.' Ultimately, these tactics delayed compliance in those instances
when agencies actually followed the law, and they raised costs beyond reason-
able levels.
137 Id. at 360-61 (quoting S. REP. No. 89-813, at 38).
138 Id. at 361.
139 111 CONG. REc. 26,820-21 (1965).
140 112 CONG. REc. 13,661 (1966).
141 O'REILLY, supra note 92, at 15. In fact, it is a misconception that the date was se-
lected for its symbolism. The actual reason the bill was signed on Independence Day is that
it was scheduled to die on July 5. Johnson simply waited until the last possible moment,
finally accepting that a veto would have been unpopular and politically unwise. See id.
142 Statement by the President Upon Signing the "Freedom of Information Act," 2 PUB.
PAPERS 699 (July 4, 1966).
143 Id.
144 See H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, at 15-17 (1972).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
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Although the Department of Justice was charged with overseeing agency
compliance, there was virtually no oversight. 4" FOIA requesters who were
denied records seldom sued because courts typically ruled in favor of agencies,
thus reducing any incentive to pursue costly litigation."9 As then-University of
Chicago law professor and FOIA critic Antonin Scalia observed, FOIA was
reduced to a "relatively toothless beast, sometimes kicked about shamelessly
by the agencies."' °
IV. AMENDING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
A. Overhauling a Flawed Statute
Congress shared the blame for the government's failures to comply with
FOIA. Critics charged that the years of compromise and negotiation left FOIA
ineffective largely as a result of vague or poor drafting that permitted agencies
to interpret the exemptions broadly in order to justify withholding docu-
ments. ' Critics called the statute's text "sketchy," "imprecise," and "ineffec-
tive."'52 In 1972, Congress acknowledged that the "efficient operation of the
Freedom of Information Act has been hindered by five years of [agency] foot-
dragging... [and] widespread reluctance of the bureaucracy to honor the pub-
lic's legal right to know."'5 3 Lawmakers observed that these compliance prob-
lems created a particular problem for the press because "news is a perishable
commodity."'54
By 1974, the political climate was ideal for government reform and con-
gressional amendments to strengthen FOIA. The public was stunned by revela-
tions of corruption and widespread malfeasance in President Richard M.
Nixon's administration. 5 Shocking accusations emerged not only from the
148 Id. at 17.
149 Id.
150 Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REG., Mar.-Apr.
1982, 14-15.
'51 See H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, at 8-10; see also Victor H. Kramer & David B.
Weinberg, The Freedom of Information Act, 63 GEO. L.J. 49, 52 (1974) ("FOIA hardly
represents the apogee of legislative draftsmanship.").
152 O'REILLY, supra note 92, at 20.
153 H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, at 8.
154 Id. at 9.
155 See generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN
(1974).
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news media, but also from government investigators and prosecutors in what
came to be known as the Watergate scandal. 
5 6
Spurred by two years of strong public denunciations over the Watergate
scandal, Congress passed a series of amendments to enhance FOIA's disclo-
sure requirements.' 57 Chief among these reforms were revisions to Exemption
1 (National Security)' and Exemption 7 (Law Enforcement) 59 because both
contained overbroad language that led to arbitrary enforcement and made it
possible for agencies to justify withholding decisions.
Exemption 1 (National Security), which pertains to information classified as
secret, is the only FOIA exemption whose criteria are determined by the Presi-
dent and not by Congress. 60 Its original language stated only that FOIA did
not apply to matters "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret
in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy."'' Under this original
language, the government was able to withhold material on the mere assertion
that the material was classified. '6 2 In effect, agencies were the only arbiters of
whether a requested document was actually classified according to presidential
guidelines. 163 Congress revised Exemption 1 to permit de novo judicial review
of purportedly classified information, allowing a judge to examine a document
to confirm that the withheld information actually fell within proper classifica-
tion guidelines as established by executive order."6
This congressionally imposed check on agency claims that requested infor-
mation was classified came as a direct response to a 1973 Supreme Court
FOIA decision that denied access to records on national security grounds."65
Congress revised Exemption 1 (National Security) after the Court upheld an
Environment Protection Agency decision not to release a report on a proposed
156 See generally JOHN W. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION (1976); BARRY SUSSMAN, THE GREAT
COVERUP: NIXON AND THE SCANDAL OF WATERGATE (1992).
157 For the twenty months that the 1974 FOIA amendments moved through the House
and Senate, various congressional committees and a special prosecutor were investigating
the Watergate political corruption scandal. Although the 1974 amendments were not devel-
oped as a direct response to the Watergate scandal, the amendments gained political mo-
mentum as the investigations deepened. See supra notes 155-56.
158 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2000).
159 Id. § 552(b)(7).
160 See id. § 552(b)(1).
161 Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487 § 3(e)(1), 80 Stat. 250, 251.
162 See H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 228-29 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).
163 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
164 See H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 229. Under Exemption l's (National Security) revised
language, judicial oversight is still strictly limited. A judge cannot challenge the classifica-
tion standards adopted by a president; a judge can only determine whether the information
was classified according to its content and whether proper procedure for classification was
followed as set forth in an Executive Order. Id.
165 See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973).
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underground nuclear test off the Alaskan coast.'66 The Court held that classi-
fied documents were exempt from judicial review.'67 The Court accepted the
government's argument that the assertion of classification in an affidavit was
sufficient to justify withholding the documents from the public. 6 ' Justice
Byron R. White, writing for the majority, explained that Exemption 1, as writ-
ten, provided no oversight process to review whether proper procedure was
used to classify a document.'69 Responding to this decision, Congress asserted
that the Court's opinion contravened FOIA's legislative intent, and lawmakers
revised national security Exemption I explicitly to nullify the Mink holding." 0
In arguing for de novo review, Moss contended that there was no reason
that judges should not review even sensitive matters of national security in
light of the long history of agency secrecy.'' He added that judges were not
legally bound to accept a bureaucrat's affidavit, stating that "a particular docu-
ment was properly classified and should remain secret."' 72 Additionally, Sena-
tor Jacob Javits (R-NY) said that the 1974 Amendments reflected how the
American public had come to expect more government openness and account-
ability on national security and foreign policy issues. Javits explained that "the
whole movement of Government, especially in view of the Government's ex-
perience in Vietnam, Watergate, and many other directions . . .should be to-
ward more openness rather than being toward more closed."'173
In addition to establishing judicial review in a dispute involving Exemption
1 (National Security), Congress clarified that agencies may not refuse to dis-
close nonexempt information based upon the rationale that the requested in-
166 Id. The report was requested by Representative Patsy Mink (D-HI) who wanted to
examine the environmental impact statements contained in the report. The government re-
fused to disclose the impact statements, contending that the report was classified "top se-
cret" and, therefore, any material contained in the report was exempt from disclosure under
Exemption 1 (National Security). Id. at 75-77. The government also cited Exemption 5
(Agency Memoranda) to defend its withholding decision. Id. at 85. The D.C. Circuit held
that the national security exemption only allowed the executive branch to withhold those
portions of the requested documents that were classified, not the entire record. Id. at 78. The
D.C. Circuit remanded and directed the lower court to conduct an in camera review of the
files to determine whether the specific information requested was not classified and could
be released. Id.
167 Id. at 84.
168 Id. at 83-84.
169 Id. at 83 ("Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive Branch adopt
new procedures or it could have established its own procedures .... But Exemption 1 does
neither.").
170 See H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 229 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).
171 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOvERNMENT OPERATIONS & STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974, at 257-
58 (Comm. Print 1975).
172 Id.
173 Id. at 311.
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formation is contained in a record that also includes classified or nonexempt
information. Under this revised provision, an agency must separate and release
any "reasonably segregable portion" of a record after deleting the exempt por-
tions. '
Congress also amended Exemption 7 (Law Enforcement) in the 1974
amendments.'75 There were a variety of critics of Exemption 7 agency abuses,
including news organizations, public interest groups such as Public Citizen,'76
and congressional law enforcement interests.'17 For example, Senator Edward
Kennedy (D-MA), chair of the Senate FOIA Amendment hearings in 1974,
referenced the stunning impact of the Watergate corruption scandal as one rea-
son to strengthen FOIA. '78
Exemption 7 (Law Enforcement) shielded "investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other
than an agency."' 79 The 1974 amendment narrowed the scope of Exemption 7
by creating six specific categories of harm that the government must prove to
withhold information. '80 In its amended form, Exemption 7 required a two-step
analysis. First, it must be determined whether the requested information quali-
fied as "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes."'' Sec-
ond, it must be determined whether disclosure threatened one of the six cate-
gories of harm.'82
In a highly unusual off-the-bench comment, Chief Justice Earl Warren pub-
licly denounced the argument that FOIA benefited only the news industry. He
explained that "when we open up Government files and documents, we are not
affording the press any preference, but ... we are making available to all citi-
174 Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(c), 88
Stat. 1561, 1564.
175 Id. § 2(b).
176 See About Public Citizen, http://www.citizen.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2008)
("Public Citizen is a national, nonprofit consumer advocacy organization founded in 1971
to represent consumer interests in Congress, the executive branch and the courts.").
177 O'REILLY, supra note 92, at 45 n.5.
178 Id. Commenting on the previous day's session of the Watergate Committee Hearings,
Kennedy said:
If yesterday's [Watergate] testimony ... teaches us anything, it demonstrates beyond
debate that Government secrecy breeds Government deceit .... High Government of-
ficials sat around in the Attorney General's office calmly discussing the commission of
bugging and mugging and kidnapping and blackmail .... Federal officials who want
their activities to remain hidden from public view are going to have to tell us why, and
their reasons are going to have to be very convincing and very specific.
Id. (quoting Executive Privilege: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the S. Judiciary Comm and
a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. On Gov't Operations, 93d Cong. 209-10 (1973).
179 Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 251.
180 Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974 § 2(b).
181 Id.; see also supra note 123.
182 Id.
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zens alike the opportunities to know what their Government is doing."'83 After
a year of floor debates and private negotiations between congressional law-
makers and executive branch officials, Congress passed the 1974 amendments
only to face a veto by President Gerald R. Ford.'84 Congress overwhelmingly
overrode Ford's veto on a second vote, with the House voting 371-31 and the
Senate voting 65-27. 85
Two years later, Congress reiterated its broad disclosure policy when it a-
mended Exemption 3 (Existing Exemptions). 8 6 As in 1974, Congress explic-
itly took this action to nullify a Supreme Court ruling that contravened FOIA's
legislative intent.'87 In 1975, the Court upheld a Federal Aviation Administra-
tion ("FAA") ruling to reject a consumer-rights FOIA request for FAA reports
on the operations and maintenance performance of commercial aircraft.'88 The
FAA based its ruling on the Federal Aviation Administration Act of 1958,
which granted the FAA Administrator the authority to determine the public
interest in an FAA-held record.'89 The Court found that in light of the "con-
tinuing close scrutiny" by Congress, it must assume that Congress exercised
informed judgment as to the needs of the FAA, and thus Exemption 3 permit-
ted nondisclosure. "90
Congress revised Exemption 3 (Existing Exemptions) by creating a two-part
test to limit agency discretion to reject a FOIA request.' 9 ' In its original 1966
language, Exemption 3 stated only that FOIA did not apply to matters "spe-
cifically exempted from disclosure by statute.""' 2 Congress amended this lan-
183 120 CONG. REC. 8167 (1974) (speech by Chief Justice Earl Warren to the National
Press Club regarding the 1974 amendments to FOIA).
184 Ford vetoed the legislation, arguing it was "unconstitutional and unworkable." He
objected mainly to the in camera de novo judicial review power granted in the revised ver-
sion of Exemption 1 (National Security). See Veto of Freedom of Information Act Amend-
ments, 2 PUB. PAPERS 374-76 (Oct. 17, 1974).
185 120 CONG. REC. 36,633 & 36,882 (1974).
186 Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat.
1241, 1247.
187 See H.R. REP. No. 94-880, at 23 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183,
2205.
188 Adm'r, Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
189 Id. at 266-67. The FAA withheld the information, asserting that the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 qualified as a withholding statute under Exemption 3. Id. at 257-58. The Court
accepted the FAA's argument that the agency administrator possessed wide discretion to
withhold requested government records if the administrator believed disclosure does not
advance a public interest. Id. at 266-68. Congress decried the Court decision for miscon-
ceiving the intent of Exemption 3. A House report declared that the ruling gave an agency
administrator "cart[e] blanche to withhold any information he pleases." H.R. REP. No. 94-
880, at 23, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2205.
190 Robertson, 422 U.S. at 267.
191 H.R. REP. No. 94-880, at 23, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2205.
192 Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250.
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guage to clarify that FOIA does not apply to matters that are "specifically ex-
empted from disclosure by statute . . . provided that such statute (A) requires
that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no
discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or
refers to particular types of matters to be withheld."'93
In 1986, Exemption 7 (Law Enforcement) was modified for a second
time.' 9' This second round provided a victory for the Department of Justice,
which had pressured Congress for nearly a decade to expand the scope of the
law enforcement privilege.'95 First, the Department of Justice and the FBI
wanted Congress to drop the term "investigatory records" and to replace it
with the broader term "records or information."' 96 This new language would
permit withholding of information compiled for law enforcement purposes,
regardless of whether the information was contained in an "investigatory re-
cord."' 9' 7 In 1982, the Court held that the term "investigatory record" referred
to any document that "contains or essentially reproduces all or part of a record
that was previously compiled for law enforcement reasons."'98 Hence, a docu-
ment summarizing law enforcement information, or a compilation of law en-
forcement information, would qualify for Exemption 7 in the same manner as
the original document, file, or record.
Second, the standard allowing agencies to withhold information under Ex-
emption 7 was lowered, making it easier for the government to reject a FOIA
request to protect law enforcement procedures. Under the 1974 amendment to
Exemption 7, withholding was allowed if disclosure would result in a specified
harm.'99 Under the revised 1986 standard, disclosure was permitted if a harm
"could reasonably be expected" to result.2"' The 1986 changes "broadened the
potential sweep of the exemption's coverage considerably.
'20 1
193 Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat.
1241, 1247.
194 See Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat.
3207-48.
195 See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 31, at 502-03 (noting that the Justice Department and
other federal law enforcement agencies had persuaded Congress that the D.C. Circuit had so
narrowed the field of protected police records that law enforcement was being impaired).
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 624 (1982).
199 Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat.
1561, 1563 (1974).
200 Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-48,
3207-49.
201 FOIA GUIDE, supra note 26, at 503. On the pro-disclosure side of the ledger, Con-
gress enhanced public access policy when legislators reduced charges to obtain records and
broadened fee waivers. See Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 § 1803.
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The FOIA amendments of 1974 and 1976 strengthened agency disclosure
obligations and reiterated congressional intent for the broadest disclosure pos-
sible. But a new challenge to transparency, one that was unanticipated by
FOIA's original drafters, was emerging in the 1970s. The era of computers and
digital information technology was dawning.
B. The Electronic Freedom of Information Act
Government scientists began using the first electronic computer in Novem-
ber 1945.202 Although analog computing machines and desktop calculators had
been in use for years, World War II created a special need for complex mathe-
matical ballistic computations. 3 The project began in 1942, but the computer
was not completed until a few months after the Japanese surrendered, too late
to use in the war.2" In 1955, when congressional hearings began laying the
foundation for FOIA, the federal government had only forty-five computers.0 5
Ten years later, the computer inventory for the federal government grew to
1,826.206
By June 1971, the federal government operated roughly 6,000 computers
with a hardware inventory valued at $23.2 billion.0 7 The original text of FOIA
made no mention of public access to computers or databases,2 8 nor did the
1974 amendments.0 9 However, some computer experts and technology schol-
ars cautioned Congress of the potential information-access problems that lay
ahead. During hearings regarding the 1974 FOIA amendments, Congress heard
testimony that bureaucrats who controlled the government's computing sys-
tems would possess "an intimidating power to dismiss requests for computer-
ized data as either non-feasible (no programs exist to retrieve such informa-
tion), or too time-consuming and therefore too costly."2 '
202 See MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY & WILLIAM ASPRAY, COMPUTER: A HISTORY OF THE
INFORMATION MACHINE 96 (1996).
203 See id. at 81. Development of the atomic bomb was accomplished by use of pre-
computer technology. See id. at 79.
204 Id. at 82, 96.
205 S. RE'. No. 104-272, at 8 (1996).
206 Id.
207 ALAN F. WESTIN & MICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS,
RECORD-KEEPING AND PRIVACY 29-30 (1972).
208 See Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250.
209 See Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat.
1561.
210 Freedom of Information, Executive Privilege, Secrecy in Government: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. On Administrative Practice and Procedure and Separation of Powers of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. On Intergovernmental Relations of the S.
Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong. 106 (1978) (statement of Harrison Wellford,
Center for the Study of Responsive Law).
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Indeed, critics accurately foresaw that agency officials would use digital
technology and computerization to justify refusing FOIA requests. As early as
1976, agencies began denying FOIA requests for computerized information,
contending that FOIA did not compel agencies to provide government infor-
mation in databases,"' or to disclose information in digital formats, such as
floppy disks or, later, compact discs.212 Some agencies disclosed requested
information, but provided it only in the form of a printout, refusing to provide
the FOIA requester with an electronic version of that record."'
Because FOIA did not establish an explicit right of public access to elec-
tronic data, such policies were made by judges on a case-by-case basis. The
case law was inconsistent and tended to favor government decisions to deny
access. Although some courts held that computer data may be subject to
FOIA,2 ' courts also ruled that the government was not obligated to provide
citizens with electronic versions of public records" 5 or to program computers
to compile information in order to fulfill a FOIA request.1 6
211 See, e.g., SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that
computer documents in the National Library of Medicine need not be made available to the
public under FOIA); Baizer v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 887 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (holding that a government computer database containing United States Supreme
Court decisions need not be made available to the public under FOIA as it is considered
library reference material and not "agency records").
212 See Matthew D. Bunker, Sigman L. Splichal, Bill F. Chamberlin & Linda M. Perry,
Access to Government-Held Information in the Computer Age: Applying Legal Doctrine to
Emerging Technology, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 543, 559-60 (1993) (discussing the practice
of gaining public access to computerized government records).
213 See Dismukes v. Dep't of the Interior, 603 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984). For example,
the Cox newspapers national news service requested an inventory of nonmilitary govern-
ment aircraft from the General Service Administration ("GSA"). The GSA refused to re-
lease the database and instead dumped thousands of pages of documents on the news ser-
vice, many of which included indecipherable computer language. It was only after Cox sued
the GSA in federal court-a costly option that most individuals could not afford on their
own-that the agency released the electronic version of the records. See H.R. 1281, War
Crimes Disclosure Act, Health Information Privacy Protection Act, and S. 1090, Electronic
Freedom of Information Improvement Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1281 and S. 1090 Be-
fore the Subcomm. On Government Management, Information, and Technology of the
Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong. 82 (1996) (testimony by FOIA
expert Allan R. Adler, Vice President, Legal and Government Affairs, Association of
American Publishers).
214 See, e.g., Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979).
215 See, e.g., SDC, 542 F.2d 1116 (1976); Baizer, 887 F. Supp. 225; Dismukes, 603 F.
Supp. 760.
216 See, e.g., Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 678 F.2d 315, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
("FOIA does not mandate that the DEA use its computer capabilities to 'compact' or 'col-
lapse' information as part of its duty to disclose reasonably segregable information.").
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In 1985, Congress held its first hearings on electronic information collection
and its dissemination by federal agencies.2 7 The resulting House Report
warned that agency control over computerized information was tantamount to
a government information monopoly.2 8 The report concluded there was indeed
"a risk that agencies may be able to exert greater control over information in
electronic information systems than is possible with data maintained in tradi-
tional, hard-copy formats." 2 9
Even as momentum was building in Congress to amend FOIA by providing
provisions addressing electronic information, federal agencies resisted calls for
change. Agencies argued that government costs would greatly increase and
unacceptable backlogs would result if a requester could demand information in
any computer format. 2 ' They insisted they should not bear the burden of pay-
ing for the new costs associated with the computerized storage of informa-
tion.22 ' The agencies were supported in their argument by the Department of
Justice, which objected to electronic FOIA access contending that a rule that
allowed the requester to receive information in a preferred format was both
unreasonable and expensive.222
Against the backdrop of rapid computerization and mounting pressure to
modernize FOIA, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) introduced legislation on No-
vember 7, 1991, that would revise FOIA to explicitly state that the disclosure
requirements applied to agency records in any format, including electronic
forms. 23 But again, repeating the history of FOIA since the 1950s, agencies
stubbornly resisted congressional efforts to make government-held information
accessible to the public. Fifty-eight percent of agencies that responded to a
1989 Department of Justice questionnaire reported that they did not believe
they needed to provide a FOIA requester with records in electronic formats.22 "
Another study found that seventy-five percent of agencies said they had no
217 See Electronic Collection and Dissemination of Information by Federal Agencies:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong. 1
(1985).
218 See H.R. REP. No. 99-560, at 9 ("The new technology of electronic data distribution
can undermine the practical limitations and legal structures that have prevented Federal
agencies from exploiting the ability to control access to and distribution of the information
that the government collects, creates and disseminates.").
219 Id. at 1-2.
220 The Electronic Freedom of Information Improvement Act: Hearing on S. 1940 Before
the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 65
(1992).
221 Id. at 68.
222 Id. at 17-18.
223 See 137 CONG. REC. 30,861 (1991).
224 Harry A. Hammitt, OIP Releases Results of Electronic Records Survey, 16 AcCESS
REPORTS, Nov. 14, 1990, at 2.
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duty to create or modify computer programs for the purpose of searching and
locating specified records.225
In 1996, after five years of hearings, agency opposition, and several revi-
sions of the bill, Congress passed the Electronic Freedom of Information Act
("EFOIA"). 26 Lawmakers made clear that FOIA's access rules applied to re-
cords in all forms, including electronic and computerized formats, as well as
those in paper, microfiche, film, and other pre-digital formats. 27 Additionally,
agencies are required to provide nonexempt records in the format the requester
desires, such as a paper printout or a computer disk, 228 and agencies are di-
rected to locate records by a computerized search, if necessary to fulfill a
FOIA request. 29 In making these revisions, Congress explicitly nullified two
circuit court opinions that blocked electronic access to government-held in-
formation. 3 °
EFOIA further required agencies to publish on the Internet commonly re-
quested information about governmental operations such as agency annual
reports, statements of agency rules and policy, agency adjudicative opinions,
and FOIA handbooks.' Before 1996, information that was subject to the
automatic disclosure requirements was either published in the Federal Register
or available for copying in reading rooms.232
After the enactment of EFOIA in 1996, Congress did not formally enact ad-
ditional amendments to the statute until the OPEN Government Act of 2007.233
However, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress
expanded the scope of Exemption 2 (Agency Personnel) to include some pre-
viously nonexempt information, particularly "sensitive critical infrastruc-
ture. '234 Under the USA PATRIOT Act,2 5 Congress created a category of in-
formation called "critical infrastructure," which was defined as "systems and
225 Id.
226 Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231, 110
Stat. 3048.
227 See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 11-12, 19-22 (1996), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3454-55, 3462-65.
228 See id. at 20.
229 Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments § 5.
230 See SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that a medi-
cal database created by a government agency is not an agency record for the purposes of
FOIA); Dismukes v. Dep't of the Interior, 603 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that an
agency may determine the format in which to release disclosable records).
231 See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments §§ 4, 10, 11.
232 Id. §§ 3, 4.
233 OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524.
234 FOIA GUIDE, supra note 26, at 191-92.
235 United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272
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assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the inca-
pacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating im-
pact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety,
or any combination of those matters." '236 Critical infrastructure includes, but is
not limited to, bridges, tunnels, public and privately operated power plants,
ports, dams, nuclear plants, and chemical plants.237
The Department of Justice considers "critical infrastructure" information to
be within the scope of Exemption 2 (Agency Personnel).238 Exemption 2 has
been further extended to include ten categories of Homeland-Security-Related
Information:
(1) information that would reveal the identities of informants; (2) information that
would reveal the identity of undercover agents; (3) sensitive administrative notations
in law enforcement files; (4) security techniques used in prisons; (5) agency audit
guidelines; (6) agency testing or employee rating materials; (7) codes that would iden-
tify intelligence targets; (8) agency credit card numbers; (9) an agency's unclassified
manual detailing the categories of information that are classified, as well as their cor-
responding classification levels; and (10) inspection and examination of data concern-
ing border security. 239
The post-September 11 th expansion of Exemption 2's provision is not techni-
cally an amendment to FOIA, but seems to represent the current congressional
and Department of Justice interpretation of the exemption's scope in the face
of "heightened concerns about national security and ...the growth of both
worldwide and domestic terrorism.
240
Congress passed key procedural amendments to FOIA with the enactment of
the OPEN Government Act of 2007.24 These amendments strengthen public
access to government-held information through a series of provisions. First,
the Act makes it easier for FOIA requesters to recoup legal fees in specified
instances when they must resort to suing an agency in order to obtain re-
quested documents, and a court subsequently compels the agency to disclose
the information.2 42 It also directs the United States Attorney General to report
to Congress on arbitrary and capricious agency rejections of FOIA requests,243
236 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2000).
237 See generally JOHN MOTEFF & PAUL PARFOMAK, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY
ASSETS: DEFINITION AND IDENTIFICATION (2004) (tracking the evolution of the definition of
critical infrastructure).
238 FOIA GUIDE, supra note 26, at 192. Courts have broadly construed the expanded
protection under Exemption 2. See Living Rivers v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F.
Supp. 2d 1313 (D. Utah 2003) (upholding a Bureau of Reclamation decision to use Exemp-
tion 2 (Agency Personnel) to refuse an environmental group's FOIA request for maps of
areas below the Hoover Dam).
239 FOIA GUIDE, supra note 26, at 216-18.
240 Id. at 192.
241 OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524.
242 Id. § 4.
243 Id. § 5.
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and prohibits an agency from assessing search and copying fees if the agency
fails to release requested information within statutory time limits.2" Addition-
ally, the Act establishes tracking numbers for each request so that FOIA users
can follow the progress of their requests online.245 Further, it redefines the term
"record" under FOIA's disclosure requirements to also include information
gathered by private, nongovernmental entities under contract with a federal
agency.246 Finally, the Act defines "representative of the news media" and
"news," and it regards a freelance journalist as working for a news-media en-
tity if the journalist can demonstrate a solid basis for expecting publication
through that entity. 
2 47
V. OBSTRUCTING THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW
Although the OPEN Government Act's procedural changes make the FOIA
process more efficient, the 2007 amendments do not solve significant systemic
problems within the statute that have developed over time. FOIA's legislative
history evinces a broad policy of maximum disclosure, and the United States
Supreme Court consistently reinforced this principle in the first two decades
after FOIA was enacted.248 Justice Byron White, in an early FOIA opinion,
wrote: "Without question, [FOIA] is broadly conceived. It seeks to permit ac-
cess to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and
attempts to . . . secure such information from possibly unwilling official
hands. 24 9 Justice William Brennan declared that FOIA's legislative history
makes it "crystal clear" the congressional objective of the Act was to "pierce
the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of
public scrutiny."250
Under FOIA's statutory scheme, courts decide whether the government cor-
rectly rejected a FOIA request pursuant to an exemption if the requester subse-
quently appeals to the courts to settle the dispute.' Beginning in the 1980s,
the balance between disclosure and secrecy was reset by a Supreme Court with
244 Id. § 6.
245 Id. § 7.
246 Id. § 9.
247 Id. § 3. Presumably, this provision is intended to allow freelancers and bloggers to
apply for expedited review, to speed their records requests.
248 See, e.g., Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976) (affirming the
Second Circuit's holding that case summaries of honor and ethics hearings maintained in
the United States Air Force Academy's Honor and Ethics Code reading files are not exempt
from FOIA).
249 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
250 Rose, 425 U.S. at 361.
251 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000).
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new membership.252 Over the years, the Court gradually constricted the ambit
of agency transparency in two particular areas: (1) information that pertains to
national security (Exemption 1);... and (2) information pertaining to personal
privacy protection (Exemptions 6 and 7).254
A. Secrecy in the Name of Security
The attacks of September I 1 th and subsequent events have drawn into ques-
tion the viability of the Supreme Court's holding in Central Intelligence
Agency v. Sims, which exempted the CIA from virtually any disclosure re-
quirements under FOIA.255 In Sims, the Director of Central Intelligence was
granted broad and unreviewable authority to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure. 56 Under the sweeping powers estab-
lished by the Court, the CIA can avoid strict classification procedures for with-
holding information, 257 and can also withhold unclassified and declassified
information on an assertion that "intelligence sources and methods" could be
compromised.25 Further, the Sims ruling permits the CIA to avoid de novo
judicial review of its assertions that "intelligence sources and methods" are
actually at stake.259
252 President Reagan appointed Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in 1981, Justice Antonin
Scalia in 1986, Justice Anthony Kennedy in 1988, and promoted William Rehnquist to
Chief Justice in 1986. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
253 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
254 Id. § 552(b)(6) & (7)(C)
255 See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 159-60 (1985).
256 Id. at 168-70. Sims concerned a FOIA request for records detailing a series of illegal
CIA psychological experiments conducted in the United States between 1953 and 1966. Id.
at 161-64. These CIA psychological tests were an illegal violation of the charter that estab-
lished the Agency. Under the National Security Act, the CIA was specifically denied pow-
ers of domestic intelligence gathering, specifically, "no police, subpoena, law enforcement
powers, or internal-security functions." National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253,
§102(d)(3), 61 Stat. 495, 498. This CIA sponsored research, code-named Project MKUL-
TRA, was authorized in an effort to compete with Soviet and Chinese experiments in brain-
washing and interrogation techniques. See Sims, 471 U.S. at 161-62. About 80 public and
185 private research facilities participated in the clandestine project in which unsuspecting
subjects were given then-experimental drugs such as LSD. See id. at 161-62 & n.2. Infor-
mation about these experiments and other questionable CIA activities, such as domestic
spying during the Vietnam War era, was leaked to the press and reported in newspapers,
prompting Congress to investigate CIA operations. See, e.g., Seymour Hersh, Huge CIA
Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974, at Al.
257 Sims, 471 U.S. at 183-84 (Marshall, J., concurring).
258 See id. at 172-75 (majority opinion).
259 Id. at 189-90 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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The CIA was able to acquire this extraordinary degree of unreviewable con-
trol over its own information by avoiding the strict guidelines established by
Congress in Exemption I (National Security). In Sims, rather than classifying
the records in question in under Exemption 1, the CIA relied on Exemption 3
(Existing Exemptions), as section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of
1947 specified that "the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible
for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclo-
sure." 2 ° Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger reversed the
D.C. Circuit's decision, explaining that the lower court's definition of "intelli-
gence sources" was too narrow and would have disclosed too much informa-
tion.26 ' The D.C. Circuit defined an "intelligence source" as someone who is
guaranteed confidentiality, and provides "information of a kind the [CIA]
needs to perform its intelligence function effectively. '262 Under this definition,
the CIA would have been required to release the names of researchers who did
not explicitly request confidentiality.263
In Burger's view, a narrow "intelligence source" definition ignored the
practical necessities of intelligence gathering and the unique responsibilities of
the CIA. 264 He noted that "[t]o keep informed of other nations' activities bear-
ing on our national security the Agency must rely on a host of sources. At the
same time, the Director must have the authority to shield those Agency activi-
ties and sources from any disclosure that would unnecessarily compromise the
Agency's efforts. 265
As a result, the Supreme Court fashioned a new definition: "An intelligence
source provides, or is engaged to provide, information the Agency needs to
fulfill its statutory obligations . . . related to the Agency's intelligence func-
tion. ' ' 2' According to Burger, the Court's definition of "intelligence source"
comports with the National Security Act's plain text and legislative history,
which suggest broad authority for the Director of Central Intelligence to with-
hold any information that may compromise intelligence sources and meth-
ods.267 He emphasized the importance of showing "great deference" to CIA
260 Id. at 164 (majority opinion) (quoting National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-
253, 61 Stat. 495).
261 See id. at 173-75.
262 Id. at 164.
263 See id at 166.
264 Id. at 174-75.
265 Id. at 169.
266 Id. at 177. It is noteworthy that the source for this definition was the CIA itself. See
Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 576 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Markey, C.J., dissenting) ("The
Agency's definition: An intelligence source generally is any individual, entity or medium
that is engaged to provide, or in fact provides, the CIA with substantive information having
a rational relation to the nation's external national security.").
267 Sims, 471 U.S. at 168-70, 178.
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discretion, explaining that the granting of such power is sound policy because
the director is the only person familiar with the entire intelligence situation.26
Burger flatly rejected the idea that judges should have the power of de novo
review, which is mandated by Exemption 1 (National Security).269 He asserted
that de novo review in CIA cases posed inherent dangers because judges have
"little or no background in the delicate business of intelligence gathering.""27
Since Sims, the lower courts have recognized that once the Director of Central
Intelligence has determined the source cannot be revealed, "the matter is be-
yond the purview of the courts."27'
In a concurring Sims opinion, which reads more like a vigorous dissent, Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall harshly criticized the majority for permitting the CIA
to evade the requirements of Exemption 1 (National Security).272 Under Ex-
emption 1, FOIA does not apply to matters that are both "(A) specifically au-
thorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in
the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact ... prop-
erly classified pursuant to such Executive order." '273 The exemption's text re-
flects the legislature's intent to provide for judicial review of purportedly clas-
sified documents to confirm that the material does indeed fall under the enu-
merated categories of information that can be classified under executive order,
and to verify that the material was classified according to prescribed proce-
dures.274
Marshall agreed with the majority that the definition of "intelligence
source" crafted by the D.C. Circuit275 was too narrow and would result in re-
leasing more material than should be disclosed.276 However, he argued that the
majority went to the other extreme, crafting a "sweeping alternative." '277 He
rejected the majority definition of "intelligence source," contending that it im-
properly equated "intelligence source" with the nearly limitless term, "infor-
mation source." '278 Such a definition, he wrote, provided "an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of secrecy over an expansive array of information" held by the CIA,
including information that was of no intelligence value.279 Newspapers, road
maps, and telephone directories could potentially fall under the Court's defini-
268 Id. at 179.
269 Id. at 176.
270 Id.
271 Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
272 Sims, 471 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., concurring).
273 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2000).
274 See H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 228-29 (1974) (Conf Rep.).
275 See supra note 266.
276 Sims, 471 U.S. at 181-82, 194 (Marshall, J., concurring).
277 Id. at 182.
278 Id. at 187.
279 Id. at 191.
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tion of "intelligence source.""28 Marshall contended that the majority's broad
definition of "intelligence source" exceeded the plain meaning and legislative
history of "any congressional act," and that it conflicted directly with FOIA's
broad mandate for disclosure.28' Marshall asserted that by invoking Exemption
3 (Existing Exemptions) to withhold the information, the CIA "cleverly
evaded" judicial de novo review, which was "carefully crafted ... to limit the
Agency's discretion. ' '282
Marshall explained that Exemption 1 (National Security) would have al-
lowed for the same outcome-the withholding of the identities of researchers
who participated in the illegal mind control experiments-while at the same
time preserving limits on CIA discretion. 283 He characterized Exemption 1 as
"the keystone of a congressional scheme that balances deference to the Execu-
tive's interest in maintaining secrecy with continued judicial and congressional
oversight." '284 Marshall further observed that "Congress, it is clear, sought to
assure that the Government would not operate behind a veil of secrecy, and it
narrowly tailored the exceptions to the fundamental goal of disclosure. 285
Since 1985, the Sims precedent has blocked access to CIA-held information
in a long line of cases that cover a wide array of issues of public interest.286 In
2004, for example, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to a D.C. Circuit deci-
280 Id.
281 Id. at 182.
282 Id. at 189-90.
283 Id. at 183-84. Marshall noted that under President Ronald Reagan's Executive Order
on classification, in effect at the time, "the Agency need make but a limited showing to a
court to invoke Exemption I for that material." Id.
284 Id. at 183.
285 Id. at 182 (citing S. REP. No. 89-813, at 45 (1965)). According to Marshall, the term
"intelligence source" does not have any single and readily apparent definition compelled by
the plain language of section 102(d)(3), as the majority held. The legislative history of the
National Security Act suggests only a congressional intent to protect individuals who might
be harmed or silenced if they were identified. Id. "The heart of the issue is whether the term
'intelligence source' connotes that which is confidential or clandestine, and the answer is far
from obvious." Id. at 186. Marshall offered a compromise definition, which he said com-
ports with the statutory language and legislative history of the National Security Act while
also falling within the congressionally imposed limits on the CIA's exercise of discretion.
He interpreted "intelligence sources" as referring "only to sources who provide information
either on an expressed or implied promise of confidentiality." Id. Marshall defended his
definition, arguing it would meet the CIA's concerns about confidentiality because it would
protect not only "intelligence sources," but also protect the kind of information that would
lead to identifying such a source. Id. at 187.
286 See, e.g., Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (rejecting the center's request for access to a CIA compilation of Cuban leaders' bi-
ographies); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting an historian's re-
quest for access to CIA records allegedly concerning the disappearance of Jesus de Ga-
lindez); Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a request for classified CIA
information about the 1985 sinking of a Greenpeace vessel).
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sion that cited Sims repeatedly in its rationale to allow the government to with-
hold basic information on persons detained after the September 11, 2001 ter-
rorist attacks.287 As recently as September 2007, Sims was cited by the gov-
ernment to deny a FOIA request for two Presidential Daily Briefs dating back
more than forty years to the Johnson Administration.288 In that case, the Ninth
Circuit observed that "after Sims, there exists 'a near blanket FOIA exemption'
for CIA records. 289
Granted, even if Congress required the CIA to follow stricter procedures for
withholding documents under Exemption 1 (National Security)-particularly
the de novo judicial review provision--obstacles to access would still arise
because the president determines classification criteria, and those standards
vary with each administration. 29' Also, federal agencies historically have over-
used the "classified" stamp, creating vast storerooms of "secret" documents.29'
As such, Congress needs to pass a new FOIA-related intelligence information
paradigm; one that would provide for more government transparency and ac-
cess to the kinds of intelligence information essential for meaningful public
discourse. Such paradigm must be balanced with the government's need to
protect confidential sources, which is an inherent aspect of effective intelli-
gence operations.
B. Personal Privacy
In order to resolve the tension between an individual's right to privacy and
the public's right to obtain government-held information, privacy scholar Alan
F. Westin observed that democracies must "set a balance between govern-
ment's organizational needs for preparatory and institutional privacy and the
need of the press, interest groups, and other governmental agencies for the
knowledge of government operations required to keep government conduct
responsible."'2 92 Congress intended to strike precisely such a balance when it
287 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
288 Berman v. CIA, 501 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2007).
289 Id. at 1140 (quoting Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1992)).
290 See Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1978) (establishing classification designa-
tions which only the President or his designee may assign).
291 See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) ("[W]hen everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes
one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent
on self-protection or self-promotion. I should suppose, in short, that the hallmark of a truly
effective internal security system would be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing
that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained.").
292 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 25 (1967).
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created FOIA privacy Exemption 6 (Personal Privacy)293 and Exemption 7
(Law Enforcement).294 In a balancing test between competing interests, it is not
necessary to conclude that in order to protect one, the other must "either be
abrogated or substantially subordinated." '295
To date, the Supreme Court has decided eight FOIA privacy-related cases.
29 6
Of these, the Court has ruled in favor of disclosure in only the first case, De-
partment of Air Force v. Rose, in which the Court handed down a forcefully
stated pro-disclosure opinion.297 After Rose, the Court began to realign the
balance in favor of privacy over disclosure in a series of decisions. This down-
ward trajectory began in Department of State v. Washington Post Co., in which
the Supreme Court decided an issue derived from the Rose opinion.2 In Rose,
the Court noted that privacy Exemption 6 (Personal Privacy) did not exempt
293 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000) (shielding from disclosure matters that are "personnel
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy").
294 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000) (protecting matters that are "records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such
law enforcement records or information ... (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy").
295 S. REP. 89-813, at 38 (1965).
296 See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004) (holding that
FOIA-related privacy interests include surviving family members of deceased subjects of a
FOIA request and erecting the "sufficient reason" test for releasing information sought spe-
cifically to investigate government corruption); Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n, 519
U.S. 355 (1997) (rejecting on privacy grounds an environmental group's FOIA request for
contact information of individuals who received a Bureau of Land Management newsletter
about the future of the Oregon High Desert); U.S. Dep't of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations
Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994) (rejecting on privacy grounds a FOIA request by unions for
phone numbers of federal employees for the purposes of contacting them about union mem-
bership); U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991) (rejecting a request for identifying
information on Haitians who had been deported from the United States to Haiti); Dep't of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (rejecting a
journalist's FOIA request for a computerized FBI rap sheet of a reputed crime figure sus-
pected of bribing a congressman to obtain a federal contract, on grounds that releasing the
information would be an invasion of privacy because the rap sheet would not shed any light
on official agency operations or activities); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615 (1982) (reject-
ing a journalist's FOIA request for FBI reports requested by President Nixon, who ordered
FBI background checks on his political enemies, on grounds that information originally
compiled for law-enforcement purposes does not lose its privacy-exemption status merely
because the information is reproduced in a new document for nonlaw-enforcement pur-
poses); Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982) (rejecting a FOIA request by
the Washington Post for passport-application information on two Iranian nationals who
traveled under the protection of U.S. passports during a period of strained relations between
Iran and the United States); Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976) (upholding a
FOIA request by law review editors for summaries of honor and ethics violations at the
United States Air Force Academy).
297 See Rose, 425 U.S. 352.
298 Wash. Post, 456 U.S. at 601.
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every incidental invasion of privacy-it protected only those disclosures that
would constitute clearly unwarranted invasions of personal privacy. 299 How-
ever, the Court did not define the term "incidental invasion of privacy."
The Washington Post case undertook the task of clarifying the meaning of a
FOIA-related "incidental" invasion of privacy. °0 This opinion, which was the
first to favor privacy over disclosure, was written by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, one of the dissenters in Rose."' In Rehnquist's view, even a mini-
mal privacy interest-one that touches on non-intimate information-was suf-
ficient to trigger Exemption 6 (Personal Privacy).3 2 Rehnquist explained that
identifying information, such as a person's "place of birth, date of birth, date
of marriage, employment history, and comparable data is not normally re-
garded as highly personal."3 3 He added, however, that such information would
be exempt if disclosure would constitute "a clearly unwarranted invasion of
[the] personal privacy.3" The Washington Post opinion thus provided the his-
torically recalcitrant federal agencies with an Exemption 6 loophole that
agency officials could exploit in order to refuse a FOIA request." 5 As one
commentator has noted, the Court concocted a balancing scheme that allowed
federal agencies to use FOIA privacy exemptions as "shields" to "repel" re-
quests for any records that contain any personally identifiable information.3 6
In 1989, the Supreme Court created the "core purpose" rationale, which fur-
ther strengthened agency withholding decisions. In Department of Justice v.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Court substantially re-
duced the scope of FOIA's public interest standard when it held that an inva-
sion of privacy would be "clearly unwarranted" if the information disclosed
299 Rose, 425 U.S. at 382.
300 Wash. Post, 456 U.S. 595.
301 See Rose, 425 U.S. at 389-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
302 Wash. Post, 456 U.S. at 600-02. The Court upheld the government's decision to
withhold information sought by the newspaper regarding two prominent Iranians. In Sep-
tember 1979-a period of great tension between the United States and Iran following the
Iranian revolution-the Washington Post wanted to confirm an unofficial report that two
officials of Iran's revolutionary, anti-American government were traveling under U.S. pass-
ports. Id. The State Department cited Exemption 6 (Personal Privacy) and asserted that the
passport information would qualify as "similar files," and that disclosure would be a
"clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy." Id. at 596. According to Rehnquist's interpreta-
tion of House and Senate reports, which he noted did not define "similar files," Congress
intended for Exemption 6 "to protect individuals from the injury and embarrassment that
can result from the unnecessary disclosure of personal information." Id. at 599.
303 Id. at 600.
304 Id.
305 See Lillian R. Bevier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government:
Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 455,
489-96 (1995) (discussing the critical issues left undecided after Wash. Post).
306 See id. at 485.
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extended beyond the narrowly defined "core purpose" of FOIA. °7 The Court
then noted that "FOIA's central purpose is to ensure that the Government's
activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information
about private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the Government
be so disclosed.""3 8 Justice John Paul Stevens, writing the unanimous opinion
in this Exemption 7 (Law Enforcement) case, emphasized that FOIA's purpose
was to enable the public to evaluate government operations and perform-
ance.3" The Court concluded that the only FOIA-related public interest to be
recognized in a privacy challenge was that of revealing "agency action" that
directly "shed any light on the conduct of any Governmental agency or offi-
cial."3
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, characterized Steven's holding
in Reporters Committee as overbroad and as contravening Exemption 7's plain
language, its legislative history, and case law.3"' Blackmun argued that the
Court opinion exempting all rap sheet information from FOIA's disclosure
requirements overreached the facts in the case.312 Blackmun offered a hypo-
thetical situation in which a rap sheet disclosed a congressional candidate's
conviction of tax fraud before he ran for office.313 The FBI's disclosure of that
information could not reasonably be expected to constitute an invasion of per-
sonal privacy, much less an unwarranted invasion, because the candidate gave
307 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772-74 (1989). In Report-
ers Committee the Court upheld the government's decision not to release a computerized
FBI "rap sheet" on a Pennsylvania businessman linked to the mob. This FOIA privacy dis-
pute arose after the late CBS investigative reporter Robert Schakne requested the rap sheet
on Charles Medico, who was identified by the Pennsylvania Crime Commission as an
owner of Medico Industries, a legitimate business dominated by organized-crime figures.
Id. at 757. Medico's company received defense contracts allegedly in exchange for political
contributions to former Representative Daniel J. Flood (D-PA). Flood, who eventually re-
signed in disgrace and was convicted of bribery charges, had been under official scrutiny
for corruption at the time of Schakne's investigation into the relationship between Medico
and Flood. Id.
308 Id. at 774. The Court held that the FBI can withhold "rap sheets" on private citizens
even though the information might be available in public records at local or state offices.
The Court reasoned that the disclosure of the FBI's compilations of an individual's criminal
records is an "unwarranted" invasion of privacy under Exemption 7(C) because rap sheets
do not reveal information about how government operates and thus fall "outside the ambit
of the public interest that the FOIA was enacted to serve." Id. at 775.
309 See id. at 773.
310 Id. at 772-73.
311 See id. at 781 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I do not believe that Exemption 7(C)'s
language or its legislative history, or the case law, support interpreting that provision as
exempting all rap-sheet information from the FOIA's disclosure requirements.").
312 See id. at 780-81.
313 Id. at 780.
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up any interest in preventing disclosure of this information when he chose to
run for office.3 4
The majority view in Reporters Committee demonstrated the Court's current
interpretation of FOIA's core purpose, setting forth the principle that the statu-
tory goal of FOIA is limited to disclosing only official information that "sheds
light on an agency's performance." 3 5 What the majority definition ignores,
however, is the vast storehouse of information compiled by the government
that is vital to the public interest, but does not necessarily directly shed light
on the performance of government agencies. For example, Federal Aviation
Administration airline maintenance records, results of Federal Drug Admini-
stration clinical trials, and census and economic data compiled by the Depart-
ment of Commerce all contain information that is of high public interest, but
does not reveal government operations and conduct under the Court-crafted
"core purpose" doctrine. The kinds of records that would not fall under this
narrow definition include: air travelers who want to know about airline safety
on particular airlines and aircrafts; patients who require medication and want
to know about the safety of the drugs they are taking; a prospective home
buyer who may want to learn whether the land has a history of toxic-waste
problems; parents who want to know the driving histories of their babysitters,
nannies, and school bus drivers; and corporations and businesses who want
government-held information for commercial reasons.
In a 1998 case that relied on Reporters Committee, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg argued in a lone concurrence that the "core purpose" argument ad-
vanced by the Court in Reporters Committee cannot be found anywhere in
FOIA's language.316 She argued that a requester is not required to show that
disclosure would serve any public purpose, "let alone a 'core purpose' of...
advancing 'public understanding of the operations or activities of the govern-
ment."'317 Ginsburg characterized the "core purpose" test as a "restrictive defi-
nition" of the public interest in disclosure that "changed the FOIA calculus."3"8
Before Reporters Committee was decided, courts held it was "fully consistent"
with FOIA's statutory language to judge an invasion of personal privacy as
"warranted" even if the requested information was "unrelated to informing
citizens about Government operations. 319
314 Id.
315 See id. at 773 (majority opinion).
316 See U.S. Dep't of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 508 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
317 Id. at 507.
318 Id. at 505.
319 Id. at 508. Ginsburg noted, for example, that in a 1989 Court opinion, U.S. Dept. of
Justice v. Tax Analysts, the Court required disclosure of Department of Justice compilations
of district court tax decisions to the publishers of Tax Notes, a weekly magazine. "That
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Sen. Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and leading sup-
porter of EFOIA, clarified in Senate Report 272 that the Findings section of
the Senate-sponsored version of EFOIA was specifically intended to counter
the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of FOIA's "core purpose."3 2' Nev-
ertheless, the majority opinion in Reporters Committee is a seminal ruling,
providing the precedent for two later Supreme Court FOIA-related privacy
decisions3 ' and several lower federal court rulings.
3 22
Taken together, the Washington Post and Reporters Committee holdings in-
dicate that a FOIA request for disclosure that may implicate even a minimal
privacy interest is almost automatically rejected unless the requester can estab-
lish that the desired information is an official record that directly sheds light on
government activities. The Court further diminished FOIA-related public in-
terest in its most recent decision, National Archives and Records Administra-
tion v. Favish, when it established a new standard for disclosing a record when
the requester's purpose is to investigate government wrongdoing.
In Favish, the Court first recognized that FOIA-related privacy interests ap-
ply to surviving family members of deceased subjects of a FOIA request.123
However, the Court did more than resolve only the immediate question of
FOIA-related family privacy. In deciding this question, the Court created a
strict and unprecedented test for disclosing information. The test applies when
the information is sought to investigate government malfeasance, and the gov-
ernment withholds the information on the grounds that disclosure would lead
disclosure," Ginsburg said, "did not notably 'ad[d] to public knowledge of Government
operations."' Id. (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 156-57
(1989)).
320 S. REP. No. 104-272, at 26-27 (1996) ("The purpose of the FOIA is not limited to
making agency records and information available to the public only in cases where such
material would shed light on the activities and operations of Government. Effort by the
courts to articulate a 'core purpose' for which information should be released imposes a
limitation on the FOIA which Congress did not intend and which cannot be found in its
language, and distorts the broader import of the Act in effectuating Government open-
ness.").
321 See Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355 (1997) (rejecting on pri-
vacy grounds an environmental group's FOIA request for contact information of individuals
who received a Bureau of Land Management newsletter about the future of the Oregon
High Desert); U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994)
(rejecting on privacy grounds a FOIA request by unions for phone numbers of federal em-
ployees for collective bargaining purposes).
322 See, e.g., Sweetland v. Waters, 60 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (denying a record re-
quest by a White House employee seeking information to aid him in pursuing an employ-
ment discrimination claim); McNamera v. Dep't of Justice, 974 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Tex.
1997) (denying a record request by a reporter asking for information regarding a $1.1 bil-
lion cocaine-smuggling sting).
323 Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004) (denying
FOIA request for copies of death scene and autopsy photos pertaining to the 1993 death of
White House Deputy Counsel Vincent Foster, Jr.).
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to an unwarranted invasion of privacy under Exemption 7 (Law Enforce-
ment). 2'
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, considered the problem
of balancing FOIA-related public interests against privacy interests when a
requester's purpose is to investigate government wrongdoing. 25 Kennedy rec-
ognized that FOIA embodied a presumption in favor of disclosure. Thus, when
requesting documents, requesters need not give reasons for their requests nor
have a preconceived notion of how the information may be used.326 However,
Kennedy added that when disclosure impacted privacy interests protected un-
der Exemption 7 (Law Enforcement), "the usual rule that the citizen need not
offer a reason for requesting the information must be inapplicable." '327 Further,
to determine whether an invasion of privacy would be permissible whenever
Exemption 7 is triggered, Kennedy held that a FOIA requester must meet a
two-part test to establish "a sufficient reason" for disclosure. 28 First, the re-
quester must show that there is a significant public interest in the requested
information, and, second, the requestor must demonstrate that disclosure of the
materials is likely to advance that significant public interest.329 "Otherwise, the
invasion of privacy is unwarranted," Kennedy wrote. "
Finally, Kennedy held that a requester must meet a specific standard to sat-
isfy the "sufficient reason" test whenever the purpose of a request is to investi-
gate whether "responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly
in the performance of their duties."33' Under such circumstances, the requester
must produce evidence of "misfeasance or another impropriety" in advance of
the disclosure in order to overcome a "presumption of legitimacy" accorded to
official government conduct and records.332
In the aggregate, the narrowly construed Court-created privacy framework
embodied in Washington Post, Reporters Committee, and Favish establish an
irrebuttable presumption of nondisclosure that stands in sharp contrast to
FOIA's extensive legislative history. There is no basis to conclude that Con-
324 Id. at 172-74.
325 Id. at 171.
326 Id. at 172.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id. at 173.
332 Id. at 172-74. ("Where there is a privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) and
the public interest being asserted is to show that responsible officials acted negligently or
otherwise improperly in the performance of their duties, the requester must establish more
than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure. Rather, the requester must produce evi-
dence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government im-
propriety might have occurred.").
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gress intended for a minimal privacy interest to trigger a privacy exemption or
that FOIA's "core purpose" is to only reveal information that directly reflects
official government activities and performance. Nor is there any foundation for
the Court's mandate that FOIA requesters must demonstrate that disclosure
would advance a substantial public interest. And there certainly is no evidence
in the legislative history of Exemption 6 (Personal Privacy) and Exemption 7
(Law Enforcement) that supports the Court's requirement that FOIA requesters
investigating allegations of government wrongdoing must offer evidence of
wrongdoing in order to obtain the information they seek.
Congress has repeatedly reiterated the statute's strong presumption of gov-
ernment openness, and the Supreme Court has consistently recognized this
principle for more than two decades after FOIA's enactment.333 The Court's
current FOIA-related privacy framework seems to be the result of judicial
overreaching that is contrary to the democratic principles of accountability and
transparent governance in an open society.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the legislative history chronicled in this article shows, FOIA's original
crafters intended a policy that provided maximum disclosure. In past amend-
ments-those of 1974,"3' 1976,"'s and 1996 336 -Congress revised the FOIA
exemptions explicitly to override court opinions that contravened the statute's
legislative intent to preserve the democratic principles of government transpar-
ency.337 Yet, it has been more than thirty years since an exemption has been
amended to strengthen FOIA. During this period, the United States and the
world have experienced upheavals in virtually every aspect of society-change
brought about by a series of powerful revolutionary forces.
Since 1976, the last time Congress revised an exemption, the Soviet Union
has collapsed, the world has been transformed by the Internet into a unified
electronic economic market and electronic marketplace of ideas, freedom of
information has gone global with sixty-eight nations now boasting Freedom of
333 See U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 493-94
(1994) ("FOIA reflects 'a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is
exempted under clearly delineated statutory language."').
334 Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974).
335 Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
336 Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat 3048 (1996).
337 See, e.g., Adm'r, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73; SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976); Dismukes v. Dep't of the
Interior, 603 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984).
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Information laws,338 the United States has been attacked on its own soil as
stateless terrorism proliferates on a once unimaginable worldwide scale, and
now the nation is embroiled in its largest and deadliest war since Vietnam. As
the 9/11 Commission aptly observed, it is "a very different world today." '339
In these times of increasing government secrecy, it is up to Congress to once
again summon the political will necessary to strengthen FOIA and remedy the
misguided Court decisions that have undermined the public's right to know
"what their government is up to."
338 David Banisar, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AROUND THE WORLD 2006: A GLOBAL
SURVEY OF ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT RECORD LAWS 2-3 (2006),
http://www.freedominfo.org/documents/global_survey2006.pdf.
339 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION RE-
PORT 399 (2004).
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